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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890383-CA 
v. 3 
VENUS ANN SHERARD, t Category No. 2 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Has defendant asserted a proper basis for 
rehearing? 
2. Did this Court properly determine that defendant 
had failed to preserve for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of 
the jury voir dire as it related to the prospective jurors' 
knowledge of Ruby Kelly's family? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Venus Sherard, was charged on May 7, 1987, 
with murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 3, 15-16). 
Defendant violated the terms of her pretrial release and she was 
re-arrested in September, 1988 (R. 63-64, 71, 74). 
Prior to the original trial date in 1987, defendant 
moved to individually voir dire the prospective jurors. The 
motion was denied "without prejudice" (R. 22; Supplemental Record 
272 at 19). The motion was never renewed. 
In 1989, defendant filed pretrial written requests for 
proposed voir dire questions (R. 97-103, 160-61). During trial, 
the court conducted the voir dire of the jury panel in open court 
and individually questioned some prospective jurors in chambers 
(T. 3-68). At the conclusion of the voir dire, defendant passed 
the jurors for cause (T. 67). 
The trial resulted in a jury verdict against defendant 
as charged (R. 245). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory 
term and timely appealed (R. 252, 254). 
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction. 
State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. Sept. 10, 
1991). Defendant petitioned for a rehearing and this Court 
requested that the state file a response addressing only Point II 
of the petition, defined by defendant as: 
This Court should apply criminal standards in 
completely assessing the preservation of the 
voir dire issue concerning Ruby Kelly's 
family members. 
(Petition for Rehearing at 4). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court accurately stated the facts of this case in 
its opinion. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. at 50-52. However, the 
following facts are relevant tc the voir dire issue now raised. 
As set forth in appellee's original brief at 19-23, the 
trial court conducted an extensive voir dire of the jury. The 
court asked questions concerning areas of inquiry requested by 
defendant as well as posing other questions sua sponte (T. 3-68). 
Specifically, as it relates to the petition for 
rehearing, defendant submitted a pretrial amended written request 
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for the following questions to be asked of the jury panel: 
1. Do any of you know the defendant VENUS 
SHERARD, her family, or Ruby Kelly's family? 
2. Do any of you know of the defendant, 
VENUS SHERARD, her family or Ruby Kelly's 
family through your family or friends? 
(R. 160) (emphasis in original).1 In response, the court asked 
counsel to introduce themselves, defendant, and their respective 
witnesses (T. 16-17). The witnesses, pertinent to this petition, 
included Vikki Salazar, the victim's cousin (T. 18-19, 455), 
Vikki's brother, Jeff Salazar, presumptively a cousin to the 
victim (T. 16-18, 283), and Vikki's nephew, Todd Kingston, 
presumptively a second cousin to the victim (T. 16-18, 339). The 
court asked if any of the prospective jurors were "acquainted" 
with these witnesses (T. 17). None of the jurors indicated that 
they were (T. 19). Subsequently, the prospective jurors were 
asked if they were "familiar" with the victim, Ruby Kelly. All 
responded negatively (T. 21). 
After the in-court voir dire was completed, the court 
proceeded with an in-chambers inquiry of some of the panel 
members. At this point, one of the prospective jurors, Manuel 
1
 On appeal, defendant characterized these proposed questions 
as "concerning the relationships or contact between prospective 
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family" (Br. of Appellant at 19). The 
State responded that the requested questions concerned the 
"prospective jurors' acquaintance with or knowledge of" the victim 
and her relatives (Br. of Appellee at 23). 
This Court adopted defendant's characterization. Sherard. 
169 Utah Adv. Rep. at 52. Since it is undisputed that the written 
submissions constitute the totality of defendant's request, a more 
accurate description of the requests is that they inquired into the 
prospective juror's knowledge of the victim or her relatives. 
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Martinez, who had previously responded that he was neither 
acquainted or familiar with Vikki Salazar or Ruby Kelly, asked to 
speak to the court because he thought he "may be familiar with 
some of the parties in this case" (T. 58). In-chambers, Mr. 
Martinez admitted that he was "real good friends" with Anthony 
and Max Kelly, two of Ruby's brothers, and that his wife's 
sister-in-law was Vikki Salazar (T. 58-59). The court removed 
the juror for cause (T. 62, 64-65). 
During the voir dire, the court asked counsel if there 
were any additional inquiries requested. In apparent response to 
an unrecorded bench conference with counsel, the court asked 
additional questions concerning sources of news information, the 
prospective jurors' areas of study or work, any physical 
difficulties which the jurors might have, and any other 
difficulties which the jurors might have dependent upon the 
length of trial (T. 41-49). Subsequently, the court convened in-
chambers to continue the individual voir dire of some of the 
jurors (T. 49). After this questioning was completed, the court 
again asked counsel if they had any further questions for the 
jury panel (T. 65). Defense counsel responded by requesting 
inquiries into the areas of the prospective juror's club and 
organization affiliations, hobbies, leisure activities, reading 
materials, length of time outside Salt Lake City, involvement in 
fist fights, and consumption of alcohol (T. 65-66). After 
counsel stated these specific requests, the court again asked if 
there was "anything else," and defense counsel responded "no" (T. 
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66-67). Returning to open court, defendant passed the panel for 
cause (T. 67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where the issue raised by a petition for rehearing has 
been fully briefed and litigated by the parties, rehearing of the 
same issue is improper. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure require a party to raise an objection to voir 
dire at the trial level or be precluded from raising the issue on 
appeal. Therefore, this Court properly concluded that defendant 
had failed to preserve for appellant review any argument about 
the scope of the voir dire questioning of the prospective jurors' 
knowledge of Ruby's Kelly's relatives. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN A PETITION FOR REHEARING, IT IS IMPROPER 
TO RAISE ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
BRIEFED AND ARGUED. 
Consistently, Utah has followed the recognized 
proposition that a petition for rehearing should only be granted 
where the appellate court has misconstrued or overlooked a 
material question of fact or controlling case law. Cumminas v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913); Brown v. 
Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886). 
Despite these limitations, defendant asserts that 
rehearing should be granted because this Court rejected her 
claim that a failure to object to the adequacy of the voir dire 
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in a criminal case does not preclude appellate review. 
Defendant's argument, both originally and in her petitionf is 
essentially two-pronged, that is: (1) the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure do not require a defendant to timely object to any 
omissions or errors in court-conducted voir dire in criminal 
cases, and (2) even if an objection was required, the alleged 
error here should be reviewed under the "plain error" doctrine. 
Consistent with this Court's directive to respond to 
the petition, the merits of defendant's argument will be 
discussed in Point II of this response. However, apart from the 
merits, defendant's petition for rehearing is improper in that it 
raises no issue which was not fully briefed and argued by the 
parties. Accord Fuller v. Johnson, 784 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ark. 
1990) (repetition of an original argument on appeal is an 
inappropriate subject for a petition for rehearing); Taylor v. 
Johnson. 581 So.2d 1333, 1338 (Fla. App. 1990) (reargument cf 
matters raised in the original briefs does not constitute a basis 
for rehearing). 
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court had 
erroneously failed to ask "requested questions concerning the 
relationships or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby 
Kelly's family" (Br. of Appellant at 19-24). Specifically, 
defendant argued that despite defendant's trial counsel's failure 
to object to the adequacy of the voir dire concerning Kelly's 
relatives, this Court should review the issue as the "need" for 
the questions "was obvious" and the "plain error" doctrine 
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permitted it (Br. of Appellant at 23). As further support for 
appellate review, defendant asserted that the waiver doctrine of 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 789 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1989), was inapplicable to the issue of jury selection 
in a criminal case (Br. of Appellant at 22 n.22). 
The state responded in its brief that defendant had 
failed to comply with rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
in preserving any objection, and that the plain error doctrine 
was inappropriate under the facts of this case (Br. of Appellee 
at 23-25). 
In her reply brief, defendant responded that rule 18, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing jury selection in 
criminal trials, imposes a different responsibility on the trial 
court in conducting voir dire than does rule 47, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, governing voir dire in civil cases (Reply Brief 
at 2-6). (See Addendum for complete text of all procedural rules 
cited.) In opposition to the state's waiver argument, defendant 
claimed that the written pretrial request for the questions 
combined with a general reference to the request was sufficient 
to preserve the issue (Reply Brief at 4).2 Alternatively, 
2
 Defendant has consistently asserted that her trial counsel 
made a general objection to any questions submitted but not asked. 
This is incorrect. Defense counsel first stated that she generally 
excepted to any questions submitted but not asked (T. 65). The 
trial court responded, "All right. Then state the questions that 
you felt the court should have gone into in more detail" (T. 65). 
Counsel then listed her specific objections in other areas but did 
not refer to any question concerning Kelly's relatives. When asked 
again if she had any further objections, defense counsel stated 
MnoM (T. 65-67). 
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defendant argued that once the trial court elected to conduct the 
voir dire, the court assumed the complete burden of its adequacy 
and thus no objects were required of counsel (Reply Brief at 3-
6). 
At oral argument, these issues were fully discussed. 
Thereafter, this Court concluded that, under the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the cases cited by the parties, a 
defendant is required to object to the adequacy of voir dire 
conducted in a criminal trial. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
52. Based on defendant's failure to object to the voir dire on 
the grounds now raised and her passing of the jury for cause, 
defendant had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. 
Identical arguments are re-raised in defendant's 
petition for rehearing. But having been previously raised and 
litigated, they should not now be considered as appropriate 
grounds for rehearing. Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. at 624 
(noting that judicial economy is severely diminished when a court 
considers reargument of previously litigated issues). Further, 
even if the petition is viewed as a variation of the original 
argument, the granting of the petition would be equally 
inappropriate in that the law argued by defendant in the petition 
was available at the time of the original briefing. Accord 
Tavlor v. Johnson, 581 So.2d at 1338 (M[i]t is well-established 
that a reviewing court cannot consider a matter raised by a 
movant for rehearing for the first time in the motion for 
rehearing"); Hunt v. County of Shasta. 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 275 
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Cal.Rptr. 113, 122 n.12 (Cal. App. 1990) ("[i]t is the duty of a 
party to see that all points are properly presented in the 
original briefs and argument before submission!;] [i]n the 
absence of a showing of good cause for the failure to raise the 
issue earlier, an appellate court will not consider points newly 
urged in a petition for rehearing"). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL 
THE ISSUE OF THE VOIR DIRE CONCERNING RUBY 
KELLY'S RELATIVES. 
Even if this Court viewed defendant as raising an 
appropriate issue for consideration in her petition for 
rehearing, the petition should be denied on the merits. 
Defendant predicates her conclusion, that the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a defendant to timely 
object to court-conducted voir dire in criminal cases, on a 
comparison of the criminal procedural rules with the civil 
procedural rules. Defendant acknowledges that in either a civil 
or criminal trial, the trial court has the discretion to conduct 
the voir dire or have counsel conduct it. Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 47(a). However, defendant notes that when 
a trial court elects to conduct voir dire, the civil rule states 
that the court "shall permit" supplemental requests for questions 
while the criminal rule states that the court "may permit" 
supplemental inquiries. (See Addendum for complete text of both 
rules.) From this variation in language, defendant argues that 
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Utah law imposes the burden of an adequate voir dire solely on 
the trial court in criminal cases which, thereby, alleviates any 
obligation for a criminal defendant to timely object to its 
adequacy. Defendant cites no authority for this extraordinary 
proposition and indeed cannot, for the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure clearly impose an obligation on defendants to properly 
raise objections or face waiver on appeal. 
The stated purpose of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure is to "secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and 
delay," Utah R. Crim. P. 1(b). To this end, rule 20, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, requires a party to "state his objections 
to the actions of the court and the reasons therefor," and rule 
18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifies that any 
challenge to a prospective juror "may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to action." Consequently, if a party fails to so 
object, rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates 
that the party will be deemed to have waived any objection to the 
issue. 
The Utah appellate courts have made clear that in all 
trials, whether criminal or civil, a defendant has the obligation 
to timely object to the adequacy of the voir dire in a manner 
calculated to inform the trial court of the error and to permit 
any appropriate correction. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 
(Utah 1988) (ruling that to preserve voir dire issues, a 
defendant must timely object under rule 18 or face waiver on 
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appeal under rule 12); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 
1988) (under rules 18 and 12, defendant's failure to challenge a 
prospective juror or request further inquiry into her alleged 
bias constituted waiver which could not be "attributable to the 
trial court's failure to do so of its own accord"); State v, 
Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (failure to follow 
procedural requirement of lodging challenge before jury is sworn 
constituted waiver); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 
1983) (even when the court "forgets" to ask an otherwise proper 
voir dire question concerning bias, failure to conform to rule 18 
by "objectfing], remind[ing] the judge of the oversight, 
makfing] a new request, [or] ask[ing] permission personally to 
voir dire the jury" constituted waiver under rule 12); Doe v, 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458 (failure to ask an otherwise proper voir 
dire question constitutes waiver under the general procedural 
requirement that "to preserve a question for appeal, an objection 
must be clear and concise and made in 'a fashion calculated to 
obtain a ruling thereon'"); Brobera v. Hess. 782 P,2d 198, 201 
(Utah App. 1989) ("[a] specific objection to the failure to make 
a requested voir dire inquiry is required so that the trial court 
may correct its error before the jury is selected and empaneled;" 
thus, more is required to preserve the issue than merely filing 
pretrial written voir dire requests). See also Keller v. Gerber, 
114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1948) ("whenever a litigant 
has a meritorious proposition of law which he is seriously 
pressing upon the attention of the trial court, he should raise 
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that point in such clear and simple language that the trial court 
may not misunderstand it, and if his point is so obscurely hinted 
at that the trial court quite excusably may fail to grasp it, it 
will avail naught to disturb the judgment on appeal")* 
Aside from the clear language of the procedural rules, 
the general intent of the criminal rules, to "secure simplicity" 
and eliminate "unnecessary expense and delay," can only be 
effected by requiring a party to timely object. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 1(b). Without such a requirement, a defendant could 
observe easily correctable omissions by the court in conducting 
voir dire, remain silent, and then allege error on appeal. This 
Court has consistently rejected any policy which would encourage 
a defendant to invite error in this manner. State v. Day, 167 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. August 13, 1991); State v. 
Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah App. 1991). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, this Court's 
citation to rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
imposes a general requirement to timely object, and its reliance 
on Doe v. Hafen do not result in any different legal standard 
than that imposed by rules 18 and 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Instead, rule 20 requires a defendant to timely 
object to any claim of error. Rule 18 is a narrower rule 
establishing when an objection to the jury selection process 
should be made. Finally, rule 12 creates waiver as the remedy 
for any failure to timely object to pretrial matters. Further, 
the numerous Utah appellate decisions on voir dire consistently 
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and freely rely, without distinction, on both civil and criminal 
cases. See Utah cases cited, infra at 10-11. 
At the base of defendant's argument that the burden of 
an adequate voir dire rests solely with the court, is the 
implication that a criminal trial judge must independently 
inquire into all grounds which might support a challenge to a 
prospective juror. Such a rigid requirement has never been 
required by either the United States or Utah Supreme Courts. For 
while a trial court has the responsibility of seating a fair and 
impartial jury, "a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its 
sound discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the same 
rule must be applied in criminal cases.11 Muymin v. Virginia, 111 
S. Ct. 1899, 1903-04 (1991) (citations omitted). Applying this 
logic, the Utah Supreme Court has similarly concluded: 
[N]o specific form of questioning need be 
followed in order for the voir dire to give a 
defendant his or her rights due under the 
constitution. The constitution does not 
require that jurors be questioned 
individually, by counsel in the case, or in 
any other particular arrangement. The manner 
and method of voir dire lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
State v. James, Nos. 890309 and 890474, slip op. at 23 (Utah 
October 15, 1991). Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 
(Utah 1988). 
Defendant asserts that this Court "has yet to address 
the plain error question" (Petition for Rehearing at 4). 
However, implicit in this Court's conclusion that defendant had 
failed to preserve the issue of the voir dire concerning the 
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jurors's knowledge of Ruby Kelly's family, is a rejection of the 
invitation by defendant in both her opening and reply briefs to 
consider the issue despite any waiver. Further, the "plain 
error" doctrine does not mandate this Court to consider 
defendant's argument. Instead, an appellate court may exercise 
its discretion to correct a trial court error, despite a lack of 
objection, where the error is both obvious and harmful. State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
Here, defendant asked the court to inquire concerning 
the prospective jurors' knowledge of Ruby Kelly's relatives (R. 
160). (See Statement of Facts, infra at 3, for specific written 
requests.) While the court did not ask the question in this 
specific form, the court did ask if any of the panel were 
"familiar" with Ruby Kelly (T. 21). Additionally, at least one 
and possibly three of Kelly's relatives were named witnesses 
about whom the court questioned the jurors' knowledge. See 
Statement of Facts, infra, at 3). Without, any further direction 
from defendant, it was reasonable for the court to assume that it 
had covered the scope of defendant's request. Additionally, 
since Utah case law and statutes have never mandated a trial 
court to inquiry into any specific areas and have consistently 
required any material omissions to be objected to by counsel, 
nothing in the existing law would have put the trial court on 
notice of any alleged error as now framed by defendant. Accord 
State v. Eldredoe, 773 P.2d at 36. 
Nor has defendant even attempted to meet her burden of 
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establishing prejudice. Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35. Accord State 
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 448 (even where a voir dire issue has been 
preserved, "an appellant has the burden of establishing that 
reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion0). Here, 
there is no allegation that a relative of the victim's sat on the 
jury empaneled. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(3) (allowing a 
challenge for cause to be predicated on "consanguinity or 
affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured"). Without a showing that one of the jurors who 
adjudicated defendant's case could have been removed for cause, 
prejudicial error may not be found. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1905 (peremptory challenges are not required by the 
federal constitution); State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 461 
(Utah 1989) (prejudicial error may occur if a party is forced to 
"exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror 
who should have been removed for cause"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny 
defendant's Petition for Rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ W \ d a y of October, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Joan C. Watt and Elizabeth Holbrook, attorneys for appellant, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this cftW->dav of October, 1991. 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The follow-
ing shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or infor-
mation other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to 
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any 
time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
itate its findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant 
relief from such waiver. 
(e) Except injustices9 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceed-
ings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the fiifag of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiiy as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party* 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
(Si) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
celled as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
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(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to .the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
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ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient 
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons 
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the 
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him. 
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Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual 
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
lenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. 
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
vided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
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(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party* or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to audi municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court The juror challenged, 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury. 
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Q) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place 
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they' 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
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party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
derk asking each juror if it is his verdict If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
charged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
dent, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
3explanations, should defer to someone who is. 
(On the other hand, such explanations should 
be made of record even if only by appropriate 
interlineation of the affidavit.) 
Finally, perhaps some deference is due to 
reflect the institutional disadvantage under 
which the magistrate operates. The magistrate 
acts alone in considering warrant applications, 
often under hurried circumstances with 
minimal time for reflection or research. By 
contrast, appellate judges have the luxury of 
group decision-making, more time, and res-
earch assistance. See State v. Vigil, 164 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah App. 1991). Perhaps 
in a very close case it is appropriate, in reco-
gnition of this institutional disadvantage, to 
affirm a probable cause determination that is 
found to be technically flawed upon dose 
scrutiny, if a magistrate acting in good faith 
could nonetheless reasonably have concluded 
there was probable cause. 
While rejecting the articulated basis for the 
federal courts' willingness to defer, I am open 
to consideration of these other grounds for 
according deference to the magistrate. But on 
the surface, one wonders why a detailed, 
written affidavit should not be Ttvtautd by 5kn 
appellate court in the same way as other wri-
tings not requiring testimony (and thus a 
chance to judge credibility) to understand 
what they mean-as posing a question of 
law, with no particular deference accorded. See, 
e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National 
Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) 
(issues of contract interpretation not requiring 
consideration of extrinsic evidence are matters 
of law); Wilbum, 748 P.2d at 584 ('When a 
contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a 
question of law.*). Either an affidavit establ-
ishes probable cause or it does not. No credi-
bility issues exist; no evidence has to be 
weighed. Why should not the appellate court 
read the affidavit and decide for itself the 
conclusion to be drawn, like it would with a 
written contract? 
For my part, even if no deference was due 
the magistrate's determination, I would still 
vote to affirm. The written affidavit in this 
case clearly and unambiguously establishes 
probable cause to believe stolen goods would 
be found at the nearby place defendant freq-
uented. With or without deference, the prob-
able cause determination in this case may be 
readily sustained. 
1. Significantly, the Fourth Amendment does not 
speak in terms of what is arguably probable cause 
or what might have seemed at the time to be prob-
able cause. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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OPINION 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction 
of criminal homicide, murder in the second 
degree, a first degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
We review the facts in the light most favo-
I rable to the jury's verdict. State v. Pascual, 
804 P.2d 553,554 (Utah App. 1991). 
I At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 7, 
1987, Sherard, with Mends, went to a party at 
I Vikki Salazar's home. The party had started 
around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived, 
about thirty to forty people were present, most 
1 of whom were drinking. 
I A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby 
I Kelly, the victim in this case, arrived at the 
party with two friends, Kristi Bray and Tanya 
Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but did 
I toow Benns, who was a member of a rival 
| gang. Benns began arguing with Sherard and 
I others, and in response, Salazar asked Kelly 
I and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's 
j protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead. 
| When Sherard reached the front yard of 
I Salazar's house, she met one of her friends 
whose face was bloody. The friend said that 
Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said 
I that she wanted to fight Kelly, and subseque-
( ntly a fight broke out between the two 
I women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and 
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard 
I walked away, Benns taunted her to continue 
I the fight. According to one witness, Eloy 
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Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard 
asked him for a knife, which he gave her. 
Additionally, at least two witnesses heard 
someone shout that Sherard had a knife; 
another testified that he actually saw the knife 
in Sherard's hand. Sherard testified that 
Esquibel put 'something" into her hand, 
which she did not look at, but believed was a 
knife. 
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed, 
moving into the street. According to several 
witnesses, Sherard delivered several uppercuts 
to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness to 
the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppe-
rcut Kelly with the knife in her hand. Todd 
Kingston, another witness to the fight, testi-
fied that after the fight he took a knife from 
Sherard and threw it away; several other wit-
nesses saw him do so. Additionally, Tommy 
Quintana, a friend of Sherard, testified that 
Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly. 
Kelly died from nine stab wounds. 
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury 
and convicted of murder in the second degree. 
Sherard appeals that conviction, raising the 
following four points: (1) Was there sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to sustain her con-
viction for murder in the second degree? (2) 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in lim-
iting the voir dire of the prospective jurors? 
(3) Did the trial court properly deny her 
request for a jury instruction on negligent 
homicide? (4) Did the trial court commit rev-
ersible error in its instructions to the jury on 
self-defense and mutual combat? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Sherard argues that the evidence presented 
at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction 
for murder in the second degree.1 On appeal, 
we review the evidence and reasonable infer-
ences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 
567, 568 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do 
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we 
substitute our own judgment on the credibility 
of the witnesses for that of the jury. State v. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1&9); see 
also State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah 
App. 1988). On appeal, we will reverse only if 
the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' 
that the defendant committed the crime of 
which she was convicted. State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted); see also Pctrcc, 659 P.2d at 444; State 
w. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah 
App. 1990). . 
The jury was instructed on second degree 
murder as follows: 
Before you can convict the defe-
ndants Venus Ann Sherard, of the 
crime of Criminal Homicide -
Murder in the Second Degree, as 
charged in the Information on file 
in this case, you must find from all 
of the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements 
of that offense. 
1. That on or about the 7th day 
of March, 1987, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the defen-
dant, Venus Ann Sherard, caused 
the death of Ruby Kelly; and 
2. That said defendant then and 
there did so: (a) intentionally or 
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, she 
committed an act clearly dangerous 
to human life; or (c) knowingly 
acting under circumstances eviden-
cing a depraved indifference to 
human life, she engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk [of] 
death to another; 
3. Thai, said defendant caused the 
death in an unlawful manner and 
without justification. 
If you are convinced of the truth 
of each and every one of the fore-
going elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the def-
endant fpiilty of the offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree as charged in the 
Information. 
If, on the other hand, you find 
that the State has failed to prove 
any of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
Viewing the evidence and inferences there-
from in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, it is sufficiently conclusive to support 
the said verdict. As to the first element, all 
witnesses' accounts of the fight support the 
conclusion that Sherard caused the death of 
Kelly. As to the second element, Sherard's 
own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave her 
something 'heavy and ... real cold and real 
hard like metal or something/ which she 
believed was a knife, and that she punched 
Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the 
very least, a depraved indifference to human 
life. This conclusion is further supported by 
the testimony of numerous witnesses who 
recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy 
Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him 
for a knife before resuming the fight, and 
various witnesses' accounts of the second 
fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that 
he actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a 
knife in her hand* As to the third element, 
although Sherard testified that she acted in 
self-defense, several witnesses testified that 
Sherard returned to Kelly and, without justi-
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fication, resumed the fight. Given the amount 
of evidence which supports the State's case, 
we cannot *ay that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Sherard was guilty of second degree murder, 
and therefore conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
D. VOIR DIRE 
Sherard next claims that the trial court erred 
in limiting the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors. Specifically, she objects to the extent 
of the trial court's inquiry as to: (1) the rela-
tionship or contact between prospective jurors 
and Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliat-
ions, (3) experience with and attitude toward 
alcohol, (4) experience with and attitude 
toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity. 
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a 
challenge for cause and to assist counsel in the 
intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Doe 
v. Hafen, 111 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.). cert. 
granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State 
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983) 
and Homsby v. Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929,'932 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Homsby v. LDS Church, 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire 
is within the discretion of the trial judge, as 
long as counsel is given adequate information 
with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id. 
• Moreover, 'whether the judge has abused that 
discretion is determined, not by considering 
isolated questions, but 'considering the tota-
lity of the questioning.'9 Id. at 457-58 
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 
(Utah 1988)). 
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning 
the relationship or contact between prospective 
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family, was not 
properly preserved for appeal. When asked to 
pass the jury for cause, defense counsel obje-
cted to the omission of several requested areas 
of inquiry, including the other matters raised 
on appeal herein. However, defense counsel 
did not object to the lack of inquiry into the 
relationship or contact between prospective 
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family. Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 20 provides that counsel 
'state his objections to the actions of the court 
and the reasons therefor.* See also Doe v. 
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458. Since defense counsel 
failed to do so as to this issue, it was not 
properly preserved for appeal. 
Sherard's second cbdm of inadequate voir 
dire, group affiliations tof the prospective 
jurors, also fails. The two requested questions 
in this area that were not asked by the trial 
court were: 
Bo you belong to any dubs or 
organizations? Which ones? 
What kinds of hobbies and leisure 
time activities do you enjoy? 
On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of 
inquiry would have revealed whether potential 
jurors could relate to the lifestyle of gang 
members or find such hfestyle opprobrious. 
However, she fails to support this blanket 
claim with any argument or analysis as to how 
either of the requested questions is probative 
of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle 
of gang members. Moreover, this was never 
given as a reason for requesting these quest-
ions below. Since the trial courts have been 
instructed not to allow 'inordinately extensive 
or unfocused questioning/ id. at 457, we find 
no abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial 
court in refusing to ask these questions either. 
, On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked 
the potential jurors: 
There may be evidence during the 
course of this case that there were 
-alcoholic beverages being consumed 
by the defendant, the victim and 
maybe others in their surroundings. 
Do any of you believe that it is 
limply morally wrong to consume 
alcoholic beverages in ail cases and 
under all circumstances, if so, 
would you raise your hand? 
There were no affirmative responses to this 
question. Sherard claims that this question was 
insufficient because it failed to address pote-
ntial jurors' attitudes toward and experiences 
with alcohol. As to the former, we are of the 
opinion that this is precisely the sort of ques-
tion which is designed to elicit potential 
jurors' attitudes toward alcohol. As to the 
latter, it is the trial court's duty to 'protect 
juror privacy/ State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 
1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is the trial 
court's duty to forbid defense counsel to 
'conduct an inquisition into the private beliefs 
and experiences of a venireman.9 Id. On the 
facts of this case, it was sufficient for the trial 
court to inquire on the attitudes of the pote-
ntial jurors as to alcohol, without specifically 
inquiring as to their experiences with it. Acc-
ordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on 
this matter. 
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadeq-
uacy of investigation into the potential jurors* 
experiences with and attitudes toward violence. 
With respect to this issue, the trial court asked 
four questions: '[HJavc any of you been inv-
olved in a fist fight before?'; 'Have any of 
you been in a fist fight or in a fight where 
weapons liave been used?'; 'JHaveJ any of 
you Q been witnesses to a serious injury as a 
result of a fight involving weapons ... ?'; and 
'Do any of you believe that there is no circ-
umstance or that it is morally wrong to be in a 
fight at all situations ... ?' Taken as a whole, 
these questions were designed to and did elicit 
responses on the prospective jurors' experie-
nces with and attitudes toward violence. Thus, 
the trial court's refusal to inquire further was 
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not an abuse of discretion. 
The final issue with regard to voir dire is 
Sherard's claim that the jurors were not ade-
quately questioned as to their exposure to 
publicity. The judge conducted the following 
inquiry: 
Have any of you heard anything 
about this case, if so, would you 
raise your hand? You can say yes or 
no to the question. Have you heard 
about this case? 
All right. Would your familiarity 
with the reporting cause you any 
reason to believe you could not be 
fair and impartial in this case? 
If you read something in the news-
paper would you be caused to 
believe that this would be true 
simply because it's in the newsp-
aper? pO.... 
If you heard testimony here in 
conflict with that which you read in 
the newspaper would you be willing 
to follow that which you believed 
from the courtroom that you heard 
in testimony rather than that which 
you read in the newspaper? 
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial 
publicity concerns the court's failure to ask 
about specific magazines which the jurors read 
or to which they subscribed. However, defense 
counsel presented no argument to connect 
specific magazines with pre-trial publicity 
below, nor does counsel present such argu-
ment here. It is abundantly clear that the 
questions asked, in fact, revealed more about 
jurors' familiarity with pre-trial publicity 
than a vague question about specific magaz-
ines subscribed to and read could possibly 
have elicited. Therefore, again we find no 
abuse of discretion. 
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to 
limit voir dire did not prevent detection of 
(Has, nor did it limit defense counsel's ability 
to intelligently use peremptory challenges. 
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the limitation of voir dire by the trial court in 
this case. 
HI. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
Sherard next asserts that the trial court 
erred in failing to give her requested jury ins-
truction on negligent homicide. We review a 
trial court's refusal to give a requested instr-
uction under a correction of error standard, 
granting no particular deference to the trial 
court's ruling. Carpet Barn v. Department of 
Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert. 
deniedl95 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon 
y. Fair, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 
1989)). 
Although *a defendant's requested lesser 
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included offense must be given when there is 
some evidence which supports the theory ass-
erted by defendant/ State v. Standi ford, 769 
P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983)), 
there must also be a "rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting [her] of the included 
offense."" State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 462 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). 
Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is suffic-
ient evidence to support Sherard's request for 
a negligent homicide instruction, and (2) 
whether there is a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting Sherard of murder in the second 
degree and manslaughter, on which the jury 
was also instructed, but still convicting her of 
negligent homicide. 
Negligent homicide and reckless manslaug-
hter are related concepts, both requiring that 
defendant's conduct be "a gross deviation9 
from the standard of care exercised by an 
ordinary person/ Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. 
The only difference is that manslaughter req-
uires that the defendant was actually aware of 
the risk of death, while in negligent homicide, 
the defendant was not, but should have been 
aware of such risk. Id. (citing Boggess v. State, 
655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, 
J., concurring)). 
Our review of the evidence indicates that 
Sherard's request for a negligent homicide 
instruction is unsupportable. Sherard's own 
testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her 
something "heavy and ... real .cold and real 
hard like metal or something/ which she 
believed was a knife, and that she punched 
Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after 
the fight, she told Tommy Quintana, *I 
stabbed her, I think I stabbed her.* This tes-
timony is inconsistent with negligent mansla-
ughter's requirement that the defendant be 
unaware of the risks associated with her 
conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no evidence 
from which a jury could conclude that she was 
unaware of the risks involved. Without such 
evidence, we cannot justify an instruction on 
negligent homicide. 
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the 
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
convict Sherard of the greater offense, second 
degree murder. We, therefore, find that there 
was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
Sherard of second degree murder and mansl-
aughter and convicting her of negligent hom-
icide. 
Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme 
Court, on similar facts, held that 'since the 
jury convicted of second degree murder 
despite the fact that an instruction was given 
on the lesser included offense of manslaug-
hter, failure to give a negligent homicide ins-
truction was, at very best, harmless error/ 
Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court did not err in refusing 
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IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Sherard also contends that the trial court 
committed reversible error in instructing the 
jury on self-defense and mutual combat. 
Specifically, she argues that one of the instr-
uctions concerning self-defense erroneously 
stated that the test of the reasonableness of 
her actions was an objective, not subjective, 
test; and that the mutual combat instruction 
was irrelevant and confusing. 
"[B]eyond the substantive scope, correct-
ness, and clarity of the jury instructions, their 
precise wording and specificity is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.9 State v. 
Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citations omitted). However, the said instru-
ctions must not incorrectly or misleadingly 
state material rules of law. Id. 
Sherard argues that Jury Instruction 
Number 26 erroneously stated that self-
defense is governed by an objective, not sub-
jective, standard. Instruction Number 26 
reads: 
The reasonableness of a belief 
that a person is justified in using 
force that would cause death or 
serious bodily injury against 
another shall be determined from 
the viewpoint x>f a reasonable 
person under the then existing cir-
cumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) {Supp. 
1991) provides that, in order to successfully 
assert a claim of self-defense, a defendant 
must 'reasonably believeQ that such force is 
necessary to defend [herself] ... against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force.* We 
have previously stated that reasonable in the 
context of section 76-2-402(1) means 
'objectively reasonable.* State v. Duran, 772 
P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re 
R./.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1987)). This 
instruction plainly complies with the objective 
standard requirement; therefore, the trial court 
did not err in giving the said instruction. 
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual 
combat instruction that was given was irrele-
vant and confusing. The instruction in ques-
tion, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides: 
If you find that either party was 
a party to mutual combat, or other 
consensual altercation, and that 
during the course of the combat or 
altercation, either party used a 
deadly weapon, then you must not 
consider the consent of the victim in 
the encounter as a defense to the 
crime of Criminal Homicide. 
Almost every account of the fight between 
Sherard and Kelly indicates that it was, 
indeed, mutual combat. It was therefore ent-
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I irely appropriate for the trial court to clarify 
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had 
I mutually agreed to fight Sherard, this did not 
I excuse Sherard'* use of a deadly weapon in 
that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed 
as the initial aggressor. See State v. Starks, 
627 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1981) and cases cited 
therein. Since the precise wording of jury 
instructions is left to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45, we hold 
that it was proper for the trial court to give 
the mutual combat instruction in question. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence 
I presented at trial was sufficient to sustain 
Sherard's conviction for murder in the second 
degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse its 
I discretion in limiting the voir dire of the pro-
I spective jurors; (3) the trial court properly 
I denied defendant's request for a jury instru-
ction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury on self-
defense and mutual combat. Accordingly, we 
affirm. 
] Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1 I CONCUR: 
I Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
I Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another 
panel of this court clarified our marshaling requir-
ement and applied it to criminal jury trials. State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). 
Moore held that in order for an appellant's suffic-
iency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the 
merits, the appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict and demonstrate that, 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to that 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict below. 
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled 
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor 
shown mat, in spite of this evidence, the verdict 
below is unsuppoitable. Appellant's brief contains 
so references whatsoever to the evidence presented 
at trial. In an apparent effort to respond to the 
marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply 
brief contains a matrix that lists various witnesses 
and their testimony on a number of issues. 
However, upon examination, this matrix amounts to 
no more than an outline of transcript citations. The 
reply brief contains no indication as to what evid-
ence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence 
opposes it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the 
chart. Nor does the reply brief contain any argu-
ment as to why the evidence is insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict in this case. In other 
words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record 
for us to review for sufficiency. 
However, since Moore, by its own terms, is meant 
to apply only prospectively, id. at 739, and since 
this appeal was filed prior to the court's decision in 
Moore, we review Sherard's sufficiency of the evi-
dence claim on the merits. 
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